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Abstract 
Studies of trade policy reform typically ignore the existence of market intermediaries in 
the food system who may behave imperfectly competitively. This paper outlines a model for 
dealing with such features, which is used to evaluate welfare changes in the UK following reform 
of the European Community banana regime in 1993. 
Introduction 
Most applied policy analysis in agricultural economics typically ignores the existence of 
market intermediaries that transform and distribute output from the farm sector before it reaches 
final consumers. However, casual observation suggests that such intermediaries, including 
marketing boards, food processors, transportation services, wholesalers and retailers, play an 
important role in a vertically interrelated marketing system. If such intermediaries were 
characterized by perfectly competitive behavior, ignoring them would not significantly affect 
analysis of trade policy reform, which, with few exceptions, typically ignores market structure 
issues. However, there is increasing awareness that the existence of these intermediaries 
complicates policy analysis, and there is plenty of evidence in the literature to suggest that such 
intermediaries often behave less than competitively (see, for example, Sutton). 
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to consider how the existence of such intermediaries 
affects the outcome of trade policy analysis. A model of a multi-stage food system is outlined, 
allowing for the existence of imperfect competition at each stage of the system, except for the 
agricultural sector. This analysis is then applied to recent reforms of the European Community's 
(EC) banana regime which has resulted in harmonized external protection for the EC countries 
with respect to banana imports from favored and non-favored countries. Emphasizing changes 
in consumer surplus, the analysis shows that ignoring market structure can exaggerate expected 
changes in consumer welfare, i.e. with imperfect competition, the marginal effects on consumer 
welfare that occur with trade policy reform are lower when markets are oligopolistic relative to 
the case where perfect competition is assumed. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 reviews recent changes in the EC banana 
regime and outlines the features of this market, which sets the context for the remainder of the 
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paper. Section 2 outlines a model for dealing with the principal characteristics of this market, 
in particular emphasizing oligopolistic behavior at intermediate stages of the vertical marketing 
chain. Section 3 reports the results of a simulation exercise for the EC banana market reforms 
based on calibration of the theoretical model, and Section 4 summarizes and concludes. 
1. Changes in the EC Banana Market Regime 
In the past year, there has been considerable discussion of the EC' s banana import regime. 
Under the Lome Convention, the EC is formally obliged to ensure access to certain EC markets 
for banana exports from African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and, in doing so, ensure 
remunerative returns. Thus, the EC banana market has been highly segmented with the ACP 
countries having preferential access to the UK, French and Spanish markets. Banana exports 
from non-ACP countries (so-called "dollar" countries), have had limited access to these markets 
due to the use of quota restrictions. In contrast, other EC countries have operated different 
policies towards banana imports. These countries have largely imported from "dollar" countries 
and have operated an array of policies ranging from tariffs in the Netherlands and Belgium to 
a completely free market regime in Germany. 
The overall effect of these policies has been to generate cross-country differences in the 
retail price of bananas (Fitzpatrick and Associates, 1990). Clearly with the advent of 1993, the 
persistence of different trade barriers and market segmentation in the EC would have been 
inconsistent with the aims of the European Single Market. Consequently, throughout much of 
1992, proposals were discussed with the aim of reforming the EC banana regime in a manner 
consistent with unrestricted trade within the EC, but at the same time maintaining remunerative 
returns to ACP banana suppliers. On 17th December, 1992, following much debate, the issue was 
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finally resolved: a tariff-quota scheme covering all banana imports into the EC was to be 
introduced in 1993 with the basic tariff level being 20 percent for the first two million tonnes of 
bananas with prohibitive tariffs on imports above this level (around 170 percent). 
In the course of these discussions, there has been considerable economic analysis of this 
issue, the most notable papers being by Borrell and Yang (1990, 1992), and Borrell and 
Cuthbertson. These papers have used non-spatial models of the EC banana market to derive 
expected welfare changes given various EC import policy scenarios. In particular, the focus in 
these studies has been on banana exporting countries rather than production in a vertically-related 
distribution and retailing system involving private firms. In addition, these studies have assumed 
that the EC banana market is perfectly competitive. 
However, neither assumption fits the facts. First, the sale of bananas is conducted through 
a complex, international, vertical marketing system, consisting of: plantation production (i.e. in 
Jamaica, Colombia and Ecuador); the wrapping and boxing of hands of green bananas; 
transportation via high-speed refrigerator vessels; large-scale ripening in the importing country; 
wholesale distribution and sale to final consumers through supermarket outlets. Second, various 
stages of this vertical marketing system can be characterized as imperfectly competitive. The key 
feature of the world banana export industry is the dominance of three multinational firms, United 
Brands (Chiquita), Standard Fruit (Dole), and Del Monte (see Read). Between them, these three 
firms account for 70 percent of the world market and 66 percent of the European market, United 
Brands alone accounting for 43 percent (Hallam and McCorriston). In addition, product 
differentiation through branding is a key feature of the retailing of bananas. For example, United 
Brands are reported to be able to sell their Chiquita brand at a price on average between 30 to 
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40 percent higher than its unbranded bananas-{European Commission). Further evidence of 
market power in the EC is given by the European Commission's 1976 ruling against United 
Brands that it abused its dominant market position, and the commencement of a second inquiry 
into the firm's activities in 1990. 
2. A Model of Vertically-Related Markets 
In this section a stylized model of a vertical marketing system is outlined. The model is 
kept as simple as possible in order to keep the derivations tractable and the results transparent. 
Consider the case of an agricultural sector a (i.e. banana production), along with a two-stage 
processing/marketing system, v = 1,2, comprised of a first stage v = 1 , where firms convert a 
raw agricultural commodity which is then sold on to a second stage v = 2, further value being 
added at each stage of the system. Agricultural commodity prices are assumed to be either 
determined competitively or by government fiat, while stages v = 1,2 are characterized by 
duopolistic market structures, the first stage selling a processed, homogeneous food input (i.e. 
boxed and refrigerated bananas) to the second stage which then sells consumers differentiated 
products (ripened and branded bananas). Note that if the input processed by stage two, is 
imported it may also be affected by border measures such as tariffs. 
In order to describe the structure of demand at the second stage, a differentiated duopoly, 
similar to that adopted by Cheng, Dixit (1979, 1988), and Singh and Vives, is used. In common 
with previous work on the farm-retail price spread (Heien; Kinuccan and Forker), the second 
stage firms, i = 1,2 are assumed to combine output purchased from the first stage with other 
inputs in a fixed proportions, constant costs technology - a reasonable assumption for describing 
the sale of branded bananas. The output relationship can be written in the following form, 
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originally suggested by Greenhut and Ohta: 
(1) i = 1,2 
where q1; and q2; are outputs at the first and second stages respectively, and <l>i is the constant 
coefficient of production, representing the share of qn used in production at the second stage. 
In addition, it is assumed that first-stage firms exercise no monopsony power with respect to the 
agricultural sector, and second-stage firms take the price of first-stage output as given, i.e. there 
is arms' length pricing. 
In terms of consumer demand, other sectors of the economy can be regarded as a 
competitive numeraire so that the consumer's utility function is linear and separable in the 
numeraire. Thus income effects can be ignored and partial equilibrium analysis can be 
conducted. The representative consumer maximizes: 
(2) 2 U(qz) - LP2;q2; 
; .. l 
i = 1,2 
where q2; and p2; are the amount and price of each product respectively at the second stage, and 
U(q2;) is given by: 
(3) 
where (3) is quadratic and concave, and the parameters a; and b; are assumed positive. 
Maximizing expression (2) generates the inverse demand function for product i at stage two: 
(4) 
where b;bi - k2 > 0 if the products are imperfect substitutes, b;bi - k2 = 0 if they are perfectly 
substitutable and k = 0 if they are independent. 
In order to keep the analysis simple, two aspects of the framework are examined. First, 
although the model can be generalized to a general, n-firm conjectural variations setting, the 
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focus here is on the case of duopoly at stages one and two, where the firms have Cournot 
conjectures. This assumption is sufficient to deduce some general propositions about trade policy 
reform and market intermediaries. Second, only the price-transmission effects through this 
vertically-linked food system are considered. 
(a) Cournot Equilibrium 
In a Cournot game, each firm chooses output in order to maximize profits, given the 
output choice of its rival. Focusing on the second stage of the chain, v = 2, finn i's profits are: 
(5) i ;¢; j 
where Pi; is the price that firms at stage one charge for the semi-processed product, and c2; are 
other stage-two costs. Profit maximization implies: 
(6) 
Assuming the usual conditions for a Nash equilibrium are satisfied (see Tirole), an explicit 
expression for Cournot prices is given as: 
(7) c (2b.b. - k 2 )(a. - p 1 . - c2 .) - b.k(a. - p 11. - c2,.) P = a. - , ' , , ' , ' 
2 j ' 4b.b. - k 2 
i ;¢; j 
' J 
where superscript C refers to Cournot strategies. 
Turning to the first stage of the chain, v = 1, the inverse derived demand function is 
defined by re-arranging (6), and recognizing that q2; = Q>;Q1;: 
(8) i "# j 
Solving out for the explicit Cournot equilibrium prices at stage one: 
(9) c (Sb.b. - k 2)(A. - c1 .) - 2b.k(A. - c1 .) Pli = A; - ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
16b.b. - k 2 
i ;¢; j 
' J 
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one pay for the raw agricultural commodity and cli are other stage-one production costs. 
(b) Policy-Price Transmission 
The hypothesis that there will not be complete pass-through to consumers of changes in 
policy prices is not entirely new. Colman (1988) has suggested that perfect transmission of 
policy prices is unlikely to occur for several reasons, e.g. the form of the policy intervention, and 
differences between the elasticity of supply at the farm-gate and the processing level (see 
Gardner). In addition, other empirical analysis suggests that slow transmission of changes in 
agricultural prices might have something to do with imperfectly competitive marketing 
intermediaries (K.inuccan and Forker). However, no analysis has focused explicitly on how 
imperfect competition might affect price transnlission. 
Having established the Nash equilibrium prices at each stage of the above vertical market 
system, it is straightforward to derive the extent to which consumer prices will change following 
trade policy reform that affects either agricultural prices or intermediaries' prices. These effects 
are separated out in order to allow for the possibility that policy reform may not necessarily be 
directed at the agricultural sector, but at downstream sectors of the food system (this is the case 
for trade in bananas). 
Focusing first on stage two, as the product sold at this stage represents value added to the 
semi-processed product from the previous stage of the chain, the effect of a change in Pii• which 
may be the result either of a change in agricultural prices or policy reform at stage one, is found 
by differentiating expression (7) with respect to p Ii• i = 1,2: 
(10) 
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Given the conditions stated earlier concerning the parameters b;, bi and k, the following can be 
stated about the extent of price transmission: 
b;bi - kl = 0, 8plf /(8p1; + 8p1) = ~; 
bibj - kl > 0, ~ > 8pl; /(8pli + 8p1) > ~; 
k = 0, 8plf /(8pli + 8p1) = ~. 
Therefore, the extent of price transmission at stage two is less than complete when firms play 
Cournot, the extent depending on the degree of product differentiation. In particular, the more 
independent the products, the lower the extent of pass-through. 
Price transmission at stage one, due to a change in agricultural prices, is found by 
differentiating (9) with respect to Pai• i = 1,2: 
(11) 8p1f = 8bibj - kl + 2b;k 
--...--......... -( 8p ai + f>pa) 16bibj - kl 
This expression has a similar interpretation to (10) such that the following can be stated about 
price transmission: 
bibj - kl = 0, 8p1f /(8pai + 8pa) = :5 ; 
b.b. - kl> 0, ~ > 8p1c,./(8p. + 8p .) > 2.; 
1 J 15 a1 aJ 2 
c 1 k = 0, 8p,; /(f,pai + Opa) = 2 . 
Again, as with stage two, the extent of price transmission is less than complete under Cournot, 
the extent depending on the degree of product differentiation. 
In terms of gauging overall price transmission through this two-stage vertical chain, the 
following can be stated: with Cournot behavior, as a result of price changes in the agricultural 
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sector, if the goods are perfect substitutes, consumer prices change by only 40 percent of the 
farm-level price change. If the goods are independent, consumer prices will change by 25 
percent. Clearly, therefore, relative to the case of perfect competition throughout the marketing 
system, imperfect competition, as characterized by Cournot duopoly, can have a substantial effect 
on how consumer welfare changes because of policy reform. 
The intuition for these results is straightforward: when markets are oligopolistic, a firm's 
perceived elasticity of demand will vary with the nature of its beliefs about rival firms' reactions 
to their particular action. Thus, in the.case of Cournot behavior, firms' effectively "pull their 
punches" in terms of output choice when input costs change, compared to perfectly competitive 
behavior, and these effects are then being amplified through a vertical marketing system. Product 
differentiation affects the results in terms of the extent to which firms are able to act more 
monopolistically, so that in the limit, when the goods sold at stage two are totally independent, 
firms simply act as monopolists. 
While it is not shown here, these results are generalizable to other forms of duopolistic 
market structures. In particular, if firms act in a Bertrand fashion, apart from the case of 
independent products, price transmission is greater than under Cournot behavior, while for 
behavior less competitive than Cournot, price transmission is less. Also, for a given form of 
oligopolistic behavior, increasing the number of firms at any stage of the vertical chain will 
increase the extent of price transmission. In addition, if there were vertical integration between 
stages one and two in the system, assuming stage one output were transferred to stage two at 
marginal cost, then the degree of transmission through the system would increase. (Up to the 
mid-1980s, there was a good deal of vertical integration in the banana export industry. In 
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particular, United Brands owned plantations, a fleet of refrigerated vessels, and ripening facilities. 
However, they have now divested themselves of their transportation subsidiaries.) 
3. Evaluating Reform of the EC's Banana Regime 
In order to explore the significance of accounting for market structure in trade policy 
analysis, the welfare changes resulting from the new EC policy were derived using a calibrated 
version of the above model. (The technique of calibrating this type of model was originally 
pioneered by Dixit, 1987). Because the change in EC policy has been targeted at banana imports, 
the analysis only needs to focus on stage two firms who face an increase in the price of landed, 
unripened bananas. 
In its simplest form, the non-cooperative game at stage two is assumed to be played by 
suppliers of ACP bananas (q21) competing with suppliers of non-ACP bananas (q22). Using 
external estimates on elasticities, the demand system associated with (4) was calibrated for the 
UK market where ACP suppliers (Geest and Fyffes) account for around 75 percent of total 
banana sales. (Note the more general, conjectural variations version of the model was used here 
in order to allow for firms at stage two to have non-Coumot conjectures). The elasticity of 
demand was assumed to be -0.4 (Islam and Subramian), and given that ACP and non-ACP 
banana supplies are assumed to be differentiated to some degree due to the marketing activities 
of firms and perceived differences in the quality of bananas, a relatively high value of the 
elasticity of substitution was assumed. Prices in the UK have been affected by quota restrictions 
on non-ACP suppliers, and have, therefore, been relatively high, the tariff-equivalent of pre-1993 
restrictions being 34 percent above world market prices. With the new EC common external 
tariff of 20 percent, the tariff-equivalent differential should have fallen by 14 percent. 
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What would be the effect on consumer· welfare following the more liberal policy in the 
UK market, and how does market structure affect the outcome? Having values of b; and k from 
the calibration procedure, pass-through to UK consumers of changes in the level of banana import 
tariffs can be derived from equation (10). Changes in consumer welfare were then derived, the 
results being reported in Table 1. 
Table 1: Price Transmission and Welfare Changes Following 
Changes in EC Banana Regime: Effects of Market Structure 
Degree of Change in Change in Consumer 
Pass- Consumer Surplus Surplus as % of 
Through(%) ($m) Competitive Case 
Market 
Structure P21 P22 
Actual 0.88 0.87 51.2 0.88 
Behavior1 
Cournot 0.61 0.78 41.9 0.72 
Oligopoly 
Perfect 1.00 1.00 58.1 
Competition 
1 Actual behavior of firms is derived from the calibration procedure, while 
Coumot behavior is imposed. 
Ignoring imperfect competition, the degree of pass-through would be 1.00, i.e. the 14 
percent fall in tariffs in the UK banana market would be fully transmitted to consumers. This 
would result in a US $58.lm increase in consumer surplus for consumers. However, with either 
actual or Coumot behavior, the degree of price transmission is less, as are the estimated changes 
in consumer surplus. In the case of actual behavior, the increase in consumer surplus would be 
12 percent less than the competitive case, while if the market exhibited Coumot behavior, it 
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would be 28 percent less. Clearly, market structure issues appear to make a difference in applied 
policy analysis. 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper, the effects, on policy outcomes, of vertically-related markets where there 
is imperfect competition at each stage, have been explored. Most agricultural economics analysis 
ignores vertical market linkages when assessing the effects of agricultural policy and trade 
reform. However, understanding the role of vertical market linkages is clearly important when 
focusing on processed food markets and, perhaps more critically, appreciating the significance 
of imperfect competition that clearly characterizes these sectors. By ignoring such characteristics, 
policy analysts are likely to over-estimate the degree to which consumer prices will change, and 
hence, the corresponding change in consumer welfare. This was highlighted with an application 
to changes in the EC banana regime, a market characterized by two main sources of supply and 
the existence of a few multinational firms. Depending on the nature of oligopolistic behavior, 
it was estimated that consumer surplus changes could be as much as 28 percent lower than 
estimates assuming perfect competition. Consumer surplus changes could be even lower if 
further vertical linkages were assumed, the changes calculated here assuming only one 
imperfectly competitive stage. 
The question that has been pursued in this paper is whether vertical markets and market 
structure issues matter in policy analysis? They do. Consequently, this creates an obvious 
agenda for future research. Only by attempting to derive a more accurate representation of 
agricultural markets will a better perspective of the effects of policy reform emerge. 
. ' 
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